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Briggs: The "Contract Marriage" Is Invalid

The "Contract Marriage" In Montana Is Invalid
By EDWIN W. BRIGGS*
The idea has arisen in Montana that a marriage, based solely on a writing declaring the intent of the parties to "marry," and a filing thereof,
following execution by the parties and witnessing, is all that is necessary in
this state to establish a perfectly valid marriage. Without doubt a deliberate
and calculated intent to evade the "medical examination" requirements of
our Code, adopted in 1947,' and sometimes also to evade the requirement of
parental consent for minors,' is a prime factor contributing to the development of this idea, aided and abetted by the officials involved, in those counties where the practice has developed.
A few years ago, a student comment in this Review' challenged the
validity of that proposition on the following grounds: (1) The Code sections relied on do not validate such procedure for creating a new marriage
at all. (2) There is no permissible common law basis therefor in Montana.
(3) However arguable these propositions may have been before 1947, it
should be recognized that the enactment into law of the "medical examination" requirements for marriage must be held to have repealed, at least by
implication, any such rule that may be thought to have existed theretofore.
The two Code sections primarily involved are worded as follows:
48-130. (5724) Declarationof marriage-how made. Persons
married without the solemnization provided for in section 48-116
must jointly make a declaration of marriage, substantially showing:
1. The names, ages, and residences of the parties;
2. The fact of marriage;
3. The time of marriage;
4. That the marriage has not been solemnized.
48-131. (5725) Contents of declaration. If no record of the
solemnization of a marriage heretofore contracted be known to
exist, the parties may join in a written declaration of such marriage, substantially showing:
1. The names, ages, and residences of the parties;
2. The fact of marriage;
*Professor of Law, Montana State University. B.S., Oklahoma A. & M. College, 1927;
LL.B., University of Oklahoma, 1932; LL.M., Harvard University, 1935.
'Laws of Montana, 1947, c. 208; REvisED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 48-134 through
48-141 (hereinafter the REvisED CODEs OF MONTANA will be cited as R.C.M.)
2 R.C.M. 1947, § 48-118.
Those persons "officiating" for the declaration, principally
justices of the peace or notaries public, also achieve a considerable "evasion" in the
fees they charge. A justice of the peace is prohibited by statute to charge more than
$5.00 for marrying a couple. R.C.M. 1947, § 25-304. A notary public is limited to
$1.00 for first signature in an acknowledgment, and fifty cents for each additional
signature. R.C.M. 1947, § 25-112. Yet, when they officiate at these "ceremonies"
they charge $10.00. If an attorney is asked to "draw up" the marriage "contract,"
the minimum fee he charges is $25, the standard minimum fee scheduled for drafting a contract, though the only "contract" is the declaration which, at least in
Superior, follows standard forms.
'Webb, The Purpose of the Declarationof Marriagein Montana, 10 MONTANA L. Rbv.
76 (1949).
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3. That no record of such marriage is known to exist. Such
declaration must be subscribed by the parties and attested by at
least three witnesses.'
A careful examination of the enumeration of facts which must be certified to in. the declaration, set forth in section 48-130, almost conclusively
shows that those drafting the section originally had in mind a marriage already consummated. They are not those "facts" which one would expect
in a contract to be entered into for the purpose of creating the marital
status for the first time on the basis of that contract. The "fact of marriage," the "time of marriage," and that "the marriage has not been
solemnized" all connote a "marriage" already completed, with these required recitals simply providing an adequate "evidentiary basis," upon
which to permit the formal recording of that fact. Even the word "substantially," suggests that the framers realized that an estimate or approximation of the time of the marriage (and hence also the fact as to just when
it was accomplished) might be necessary. Something of the incongruity of
the contrary construction is suggested strongly by the statement in the declaration form generally used,' attempting to satisfy the requirements of
section 48-130: "We do hereby declare that we are married and do enter
into the marriage relationship at this time and place and at the time of the
execution of this declaration ... we hereby certify that this marriagehas not
been solemnized." Of what conceivable use are the italicized portions, if
it is a marriage just now being created for the first time by the present
declaration ?
A remarkable thing about this modern interpretation of these sections,
asserting the validity of the "contract marriage," is that it flies in the face
of and is in direct conflict both with leading California and Montana deci'Emphasis added. Note that § 48-131 is described editorially as simply setting forth
the "contents" of the declaration provided for in § 48-130. Webb demonstrates conclusively that this is an incorrect description of that section. Webb, supra note 3,
at 77-79.
5
The standard form, apparently used often in Superior is as follows:
DECLARATION OF MARRIAGE
H ............ and W ............ do hereby jointly make and execute a declaration of
marriage and make the following statements and representations of facts
pursuant to the provisions of R.G.M. 1947, section 48-130.
That H ............ is ............ years of age, and resides at ..................................
That V............ is ............ years of age, and resides at ..... :........................
We do hereby declare that we are married and do enter into the marriage relationship at this time and place and at the time of the day of
................. , 19 ............ at .................... AM PM .
We hereby certify that this marriage has not been solemnized.
In witness whereof, we hereunto set our hands this ............................ day
of ........................
19.............
Signatures of H and V.

Signatures of two witnesses.

Notarization.

Another form in common use assumes the necessity of stating the declaration in
terms of a mutually binding agreement creating the marriage relationship for the
first time, in the present moment. It requires each party to affirm that: "I do here
in tbe presence of Almighty God and these witnesses, take H (TV) to be my lawfully
wedded husband (wife), and I do hereby acknowledge and declare myself to be the
lawfully wedded wife (husband) of H. (W) .... ," though it also complies with the
proviso that the declaration "substantially show" that the marriage has not been
solemnized. The degree of formality used by different officials varies greatly, also.
Some justices of the peace carry out essentially the same ceremony as if it were
based on a marriage license.
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sions construing section 48-130. Relying on an earlier California case, the
Montana Supreme Court declares, in State v. Newman :'
It is not suggested by counsel for the defendant, who acted as notary in taking the acknowledgment of the parties to the declaration, that this constitutes a marriage in itself. It does not contain
a present promise to enter into the marriage relation, but refers
back to the alleged contract of marriage on the 27th of November,
1921. In Toone v. Huberty, 104 Cal. at 260, 37 Pac. 944, the
supreme court of California held that a declaration conforming in
all respects to the requirements of section 75 of the Civil Code,
which is identical with section 5724 of our Code, did not constitute
a marriage. Independent of the declaration, there must be all of
the elements necessary before a marriage can result. The declaration was provided by statute for the purpose of authenticating a
marriage. It takes the place, in an unsolemnized marriage, of the
certificate filed by the officiating magistrate or clergyman in the
case of a solemnized marriage.
So it is submitted that both the wording of this section and the most authoritative decisions construing it justify the conclusion that its purpose was
not to provide an alternative ceremony or method for creating a marriage,
but rather was simply to furnish a formal procedure for regularizing and
making a matter of record marriages already in existence but created in
some irregular manner, or under section 48-131 for restoring records of
formally existing marriages, the records of which may have been destroyed
in one way or another. The first class-the irregular marriages-include
the common law marriages, and very possibly marriages which may have
originally been approved by special tribal or church ceremonies, ' but without that legal record of their existence normally made of civil marriages.
The second class is dramatically illustrated by the mass destruction of records in the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906.'
'State v. Newman, 66 Mont. 180, 192, 213 Pac. 805. 808 (1923) (emphasis added).
Although the particular declaration involved in this case correctly relied on an alleged common law marriage, consummated in the past, the court found that there
was not the necessary common law marriage because of no "public assumption."
The only thing left to support the marriage is the declaration, and it is on this point
that the court states so positively as a general principle that the "declaration," of
itself, is never sufficient to create a marriage-rather is its purpose merely to
authenticate a marriage already in existence.
Despite this case, a defendant, jailed on a statutory rape charge, recently was
allowed to avoid prosecution in Western Montana, by getting the girl, who was the
state's only witness, to join with him in a declaration, and having it filed.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 48-116 provides:
By whom marriages may be solemnized. Marriage may be solemnized by
either a justice of the supreme court, judge of the district court, justice of
the peace, priest, or minister of the gospel of any denomination, or the
mayor of any city. Marriages may also be solemnized by religious societies
according to the usage of such societies.
Perhaps the declaration and recording of marriages "solemnized" by the "usage"
of religious societies should be effected under § 48-131, which applies to "solemnized
marriages" for which no "record" is known to exist. It at least should be permissible to so declare thereunder. In 1897, California enacted § 79Y2 (now § 79a) of
the Civil Code declaring that, though the statutory ceremonial requirements were
not applicable to religions having "peculiar modes of entering the marriage relations," such marriages "must be declared as provided in § 76 [our § 48-131]."
8
Though nothing is said about marriages by Indian tribal custom, or similar customs,
such marriages would seem to be eminently fitting subjects for declaration under
one or the other of these sections, at least whenever such Indian couple decides to
live apart from and outside the tribe.
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Not only do both the wording of these sections and the most authoritative decisions construing them fully support the above conclusions, but an
examination of their history in the California Code, where they originated,
is as conclusive of the correctness of those conclusions as history can be.
That history also reveals that the editorial description of section 48-131, as
involving merely the contents of the declaration required by section 48-130,
is based on the erroneous assumption that both deal with the same subject
matter. Such is not the case. As edited in the California Code, its corresponding section is described as "involving a declaration where there is no
record of the solemnization "-a very different subject from that indicated
in the Montana Code. The subsequent history of these sections in California, following the Montana adoption of them from California in 1895, demonstrating that these explanations have always been the accepted ones in
California, and that they have never lost sight of them, is detailed in Mr.
Webb's comment.
Since the interpretation given these sections by some Montana lawyers
is in such basic conflict' (1) with every other section in the Montana Domestic Relations Code limiting the conditions and procedures for creating the
marital relationship, (2) with the sections' wording, (3) with the controlling court decisions, and (4) with their history, the only rational explanation therefor is the want of an apparent reason for their presence in
the Code other than to create a marriage. Once it is realized generally that
there is an entirely adequate explanation for them, consistent with other
provisions of the Code, without resorting to this extreme explanation, the
supposition that they provide an extremely informal and hasty alternative
"ceremony" for creating the marriage should be rejected forthwith.
Mr. Webb gave solemn warning that this so-called "contract marriage"
was being used especially to evade the then recent requirements of a premarital medical examination both by Montana residents and by "others who
come into the state for the purpose of avoiding the laws of their domicil."
Within the brief period of seven years the volume of "evasion," in one
county seat alone, has become appaling. The town of Superior, County
Seat of Mineral County, has become notorious as the "Gretna Green" of
Montana. The competition for the traffic has become so intense that some
of its citizens are operating "marriage mills" with flamboyant, large signs,
garishly lighted all night to entice prospective customers to the advertiser's
door.
The court records there starkly reveal the volume of this business." The
Oln addition to the fact that all of the Domestic Relations Code dealing with marriage, gives every indication that, in setting forth the procedures for securing a license, it is intending to provide for the exclusive method for marriage thereby, and
to the clear implications of the premarital medical examination requirement, a third
section in the series we are now examining, further supports our conclusions. R.C.M.
1947, § 48-133, states: "If either party to any marriage denies' the same, or refuses
to join n a declaration thereof, the other may proceed, by action in the district
court, to have the validity of the marriage determined and declared." (Emphasis
added.) Note that at least one party claims that a marriage already has been consummated, in this section, which merely completes the group of four sections dealing
with the recording of irregularmarriages.
1°1 am glad to acknowledge the able assistance, in this study, of Mrs. Mary H. O'Neill,

Clerk of the Court of Mineral County, at Superior, and Mr. Thomas Murray, who
practiced law in Superior for some years and is now in the County Attorney's office
in Missoula. I am indebted to them for compiling the statistical data revealing the
extent of the use of the declaration and filing to establish the marriage relationship.
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first recorded declaration, in the modern records at least, now kept separately from other filings, was on July 3, 1947-just three days after the "medical examination" law became effective. For the last six months of 1947,
91 contract, and eight licensed marriages were recorded. For the full year
1955, 203 contract, and 28 licensed marriages were filed.'1 For the first ten
months and five days in 1956, to November 5, 222 contract, and 30 licensed
marriages were filed. Already boasting a record number of contracts, 1956
holds promise of exceeding any previous year by quite a large number. The
over-all statistics for the past nine years show a very definite growth trend
involving a growing practice of evasion with an attendant prosperous
"marriage mill business" for Superior. The total number of contract marriages from July 1, 1947, to November 5, 1956, is 1830. The total of licensed
marriages is 287.
In 1947, 84 nonresidents and seven residents filed declarations ; in 1955,
146 nonresidents and 57 residents used this device for" marrying." In contrast, licenses were issued to thirteen nonresidents and fifteen residents in
the latter year.
On the face of the records, the percentage of minors marrying by contract does not appear to be very large. A rough count reveals only 130 of
the total of 1830 contract marriages involve one or more minors. This is
about 7.1 per cent of the total. Taking this number at its face value, the
first thing to be noted is that there appears to be no protection whatever
given to the interest of the parents in the marriage of minors-parental
consent is not a condition to the entering into and filing of a declaration.
This is another of the serious evasions of the law which the "declaration"
makes possible. That this frequently has devastating effects on the parentchild relation in families in other states, as well as our own, is attested to
by the fact that more than once the court clerk in Superior has received
anxious inquiries from nonresident parents asking whether it is possible
that their child actually has been legally married in Montana simply by a
"First contract marriage issued July 3, 1947.

Marriage licenses sold from Jan. 1, 1947, to July 1, 1947-271. Superior has long
operated as a marriage mill for nonresidents, particularly from Idaho and Washington, who have wanted to avoid the premarital medical examination requirements
or other delaying regulations in their home state. This astounding first half-year
total of licenses issued, reveals that Superior has only partly recovered that business by resort to the "contract marriage" declaration, as a device for evading Montana's own medical examination requirement. Though it is being used in growing
volume, not all people are willing to rely on it.
Year
Contracts Licenses
Year
Contracts Licenses
July 1, 1947 to

1953

.......................... 209

30

Dec. 31, 1947 .......... 91
8
1954 ......................... 208
36
1948 ..........................
159
25
1955 ..........................
203
28
1949 .......................... 179

25

1956 to Nov. 5th....222

38

40
219
1950 ..........................
1951 ..........................
157
25
1830
287
1952 .........................
183
32
'It is of some interest to note that the contract marriage also is used in Missoula
County, although only very rarely. From July 1, 1947, to December 1, 1956, the
court clerk at Missoula issued 4,772 licenses and filed 70 declarations. Also of interest is the fact that although Missoula County has several times the population
of Superior, the latter did practically half as much "marriage business" as did the
former, From January 1, to July 1, 1947, no declaration was filed.
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filed written agreement, while he or she was supposed to be "out" just for
the evening on a date."
Moreover, there is much reason to doubt the accuracy of the percentage
just given. Indeed, one of the most serious objections to this whole procedure is the extremely lax, informal, and wholly unreliable basis on which
the asserted "qualifications" of the principals concerned are established.
Originally, a single instrument, known as the declaration, was filed, subscribed by two witnesses, which declaration, framed apparently on the provisions of section 48-130" (though that section says nothing of witnesses),
stated at one and the same time that "we do hereby declare that we are
married," and also that " [we] do enter into the marriage relationship at
this time and place and at the time of the execution of this declaration."
About three months later, the requirement that each party make an affidavit as to his qualifications was added. A comparison between the declaration and the affidavits frequently shows a discrepancy between the two as
to the age qualifications of one or both parties. Irregularity and/or carelessness is further demonstrated by such things as a single witness, though
two are required by the form, and "notarizing" by the then clerk of the
court, not a notary, but using another's expiration date, and putting on the
court seal. The consequences of such informality are further revealed by one
case in particular in which H's real name was Welsch. For some reason W
induced H to promise to change his name to Thomas, so the declaration was
subscribed in the name of Thomas. H never did effect the legal change of
1

Actually, a considerable amount of the court clerk's time in Superior is devoted to
answering inquiries of all kinds relating to or growing out of its "marriage mill"
business. And the anxious inquiries from parents are all too common.
The following news item, appearing in the Daily Missoulian for December 19,
1956, illustrates the participation of Montana and Superior in a developing domestic
tragedy occurring in a distant state, hundreds of miles away:

San Francisco (AP)-A teen-age mental hospital patient was sought
throughout California Tuesday on a charge that he kidnaped his pretty
bride at gunpoint from the Daly City home of her parents and fled in a
stolen car.
The 16-ye'ir-old husband, Michael Wiegner ... broke into the home of
Mr. and Mrs. John Mowatt at Daly City, police said, bound the couple and
dragged off their protesting daughter, Clo Ann, 17.
Probation Officer Anthony Lovoy said Clo Ann and Wiegner eloped in
November and ivoere married in Superior, Montana. The girl was brought
back to Daly City.
The boy was taken to the Napa hospital only last Friday. He had been
in trouble with police since he was 14.
Lovoy said Clo Ann felt that Michael needed love and tenderness and it
was her duty to "stand by him." But. Lovoy added: "She learned quickly
that love wasn't enough to reform a hoodlum. She said she wanted to be
rid, of the boy." (Emphasis added.)
Almost certainly this couple used the contract marriage. Apparently, Wiegner had
to travel hundreds of miles, through several states, before finding a marriage mill
tailored to suit his needs exactly.
"Although § 48-131 is clearly described as intending to explain what must be contained in the "declaration" provided for in § 48-130, probably whoever originally
drafted the form in general use in Superior, ignored the former section. It certainly
ignores the clear express requirement of three witnesses called for by that section.
And very probably, one of the two witnesses it does call for will be the notary or
other "official" presiding. Often no attempt is made to have more than one witness. Cf. Webb, supra note 3, at 76, n. 1. The court clerk'si office in quperior has
been very concerned because three witnesses are not used as prescribed by § 48-131,
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name, however. Thq prospective mother then inquired of some of the local
officials in what name she should record the birth of her child, to be born
shortly.
Although the early records reveal a number of minors, below the statutory age of "capacity to marry," "contracting" a marriage, apparently
this was stopped a few years ago by formal proceedings against some of
those officiating therein.' Hence, the one place for which there might be
some social justification advanced for the exceptional use of the "contract
marriage," is precluded by that action. That is, the case occasionally arises
of a girl below the statutory age of capacity who has become pregnant.
Though both the prospective mother and father may be very anxious to
marry, and the parents of both are equally anxious, few if any court clerks
will issue a license therefor.'
One of the more serious objections to the so-called "contract marriage"
is the extremely cavalier treatment it often gets from the principals themselves. There is much reason to suspect that they often assume that a
marriage so easily created by simple declaration can be just as easily dissolved. Several of these persons have been back a number of times to enter
into still another "contract," with a different party each time.1' Though
the affidavits presumably recite that they have been "divorced," from the
prior spouse, there is no evidence of what they understand to be necessary
to constitute a "divorce."
Then there always is the strong possibility that,
if a nonresident litigates his marital status in the foreign domiciliary court,
the court will find that he never has been lawfully married at all-thus
requiring either an annulment or a declaration of nullity." This much is
'The court records in Superior indicate that two persons, one a notary public and
the other a notary public and justice of the peace, were fined for marrying "minors"
by contract. Presumably these were persons under the statutory age of capacity
to marry.
"Cf. Briggs, The Status of an Annu led Marriage in Montana, 4 MONTANA L. REv.
14, 35 (1943). Citing various cases from several other states and showing the influence of common law doctrine on decisions interpreting codes setting statutory age
limits on the capacity to marry, the author advanced the view that under the influence of these decisions, and under the special problems actually facing it in actual
cases, the Montana Supreme Court probably would decide that the common law ages
governing "capacity" still would prevail. He had no thought, however, of approving
the old common law in its recognition of the "inchoate" marriage under the ages
of twelve and fourteen respectively.
'At least seventeen men have been married two or more times by contract in Superior
in the last eight years. Five have been married three times, and one has filed a
different declaration four times between the middle of 1951 and early in 1956. The
declarations never give the mailing address of the principals--only the towns allegedly their residences. One W.J.H. filed a declaration of marriage on January
IS, 1951; he was back to file another one with a different woman on April 4, 1951,
less than two and one half months apart. Though generally, of course, It was not
nssible to check on the divorces of these people, that was possible for the one havin* four declarations to his credit, one L.A.. giving Missoula as his residence. The
names of the women involved Indicate that probably only two different persons were
involved. He actually has three divorces recorded to his credit in Missoula. He
lz omq to be marrying, divorcing, and remarrying the same girl much of the time.
"If such annulment should occur in California, almost certainly any court there
would rule that the parties were not married in Montana by the declaration. All
of the "authority" available to them would compel that result. Their own statutory
b'Qtory of these and related sections and the pertinent Judicial authority, both in
California and Montana, all compel that conclusion. And if the issue arose In another state it would be guided by exactly the same criteria, forcing them to consider
whether there had been the acts required by the governing law to establish a common law marriage Rlubsequent to the declaration,
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clear-it is quite impossible for a foreign court to establish the legal status
of the "contract marriage" in Montana, so long as that status is so uncertain and doubtful in Montana itself. That provides still another strong
reason why the Montana legislature should deal resolutely and effectively
to clear up this scandalous state of the law, by appropriate clarification of
the Code sections involved.
Such clarification can be achieved in a number of ways. Perhaps the
simplest method would be by slight amendment in the wording of sections
48-130 and 48-131. That portion of section 48-130, now stating, "Declaration of marriage-how made. Persons married without the solemnization . . .," should be amended to read as follows:

summated marriages-how made.

"Declaration

of con-

Persons who have consummated a mar-

riage, but without the solemnization. . .

."

The only change called for in

section 48-131 is in its editorial description. Whereas it now states, "Contents of declaration," it should be made to read, "Declaration where there
is no record of the solemnization," as California's statute has always described it.
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